The social partners often attain a more central role in decision-making during social or economic crises. This article examines whether this held true in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands during the COVID-19 pandemic. These are countries with strong institutionalised power relations. It assesses whether the crisis affected institutional stability and social partner representation, referred to as crisis corporatism. Drawing on 30 interviews with representatives of social partner organisations and government agencies, as well as labour market experts, we demonstrate strong institutional stability and path dependence in industrial relations during the crisis. While Sweden’s institutionalised power relations remained stable, Finland and the Netherlands experienced temporary shifts, with governments bypassing the social partners on health-related issues. The health-care sector and precarious workers emerged as especially vulnerable.

Alm, S., Nelson, K., & Nieuwenhuis, R. (2019). The Diminishing Power of One? Welfare State Retrenchment and Rising Poverty of Single-Adult Households in Sweden 1988–2011. European Sociological Review, 0(0), 20.

Will the Sverigedemokraterna become the largest party in Sweden? The best prediction we have: probably not. Although polls are not perfect, several recent polls independently estimate that the Sverigedemokraterna will win about 18% of the votes, with an error margin of about 2%. They may gain a so-called curtain bonus (people are hesitant to say they will vote for the Sverigedemokraterna to pollsters, but will do so behind the curtain of the voting booth), but are pretty far behind the largest party in the polls (the Social Democratic Party, at around 25%). Yet, of course, we all remember the polls predicting Hillary Clinton to win the presidential election …

At the very least, it does seem safe to say that the radical right will become an (even more) influential faction in Swedish politics. Having played only a marginal role in the years after their foundation in 1988, the Sverigedemokraterna won 3% of the votes in the national parliamentary elections in 2006, about 7% in 2010, and 13% in 2014. Polls suggest their support has been growing since, with a particularly marked rise during the 2015 refugee crisis. Tonight or tomorrow we will know how much they will have grown in 2018.

There is resistance, as is to be expected. In its most basic form, most people plan to vote for different parties, and most parties pledged they will not form a coalition with Sverigedemokraterna. Other forms of resistance, based on what I have seen and heard in Stockholm, include besmirching posters of the Sverigedemokraterna with swastikas and (what looks like) excrement, linking them to their roots of self-identification with the Nazi’s, calls for a ban on demonstrations for related (and far-right) groups, and semi-serious advertisements to remind voters to go and vote Sverigedemokraterna on Monday – the day after election day. I know these things happen in all elections, but I think it is an affront to the intelligence of all voters, including those voting for the Sverigedemokraterna. Stigmatizing people who vote for Sverigedemokraterna does not take seriously their political concerns and challenges in life.

A major driving force behind the growing support for the Sverigedemokraterna is rising economic inequality. That’s right: inequality, not immigration. Even though concerns about immigration are often cited by people voting for Sverigedemokraterna, this cannot explain why support for this party has been rising specifically during the last decade. Sweden has a tradition of welcoming refugees and other immigrants that goes back a long time, and previously that did not lead to support for the radical right. A recent study (not yet peer-reviewed) indeed showed that a rise of inequality in Swedish municipalities, and not the number of immigrants, explained rising support for Sverigedemokraterna.

Inequality is rising profoundly in Sweden. In fact, of all the rich countries in the OECD, economic inequality was rising fastest in Sweden. And people are saying they struggle. They have difficulties finding affordable public housing. The social safety net is gone. For many, their pension is too low. No wonder that populists can convince voters that immigrants occupy ‘our’ houses, plunder ‘our’ safety net, and that ‘we’ have to choose between immigrants or pensions. No wonder, but in fact these concern have to do with politics – little with immigration. Public housing agencies made huge profits by selling substantial parts of their housing stock in the private market. The center-right government of 2006 substantially reduced levels of unemployment benefits, made it so that fewer people qualify for unemployment benefits, and gave tax benefits to the working. Intentionally, this government increased the income differences between working ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ without a (secure) job. Poverty among pensioners is rising indeed, which is a direct result of pension privatization led (in important parts) by the social democrats in 1998. However, as pension rights accumulate over decades, the consequences of this pension reform are only now becoming apparent. These are just examples in the areas of housing, unemployment benefits, and pensions, but all took place long before the 2015 immigrant crisis that lent support to the Sverigedemokraterna.

Democracy is not for the faint of heart. Many voters, as well as the established parties vehemently disagree with the Sverigedemokraterna. And that is legitimate. Yet, no matter how strongly one disagrees with the solutions proposed by the Sverigedemokraterna, the problems faced by their electorate are real and should be taken seriously. Many face an insecure future and have difficulties to make ends meet, which in part is the direct result of political decisions made by the establishment. If the establishment does not listen, they stand to lose far more than today’s elections.

Much of this has been detailed by scholars such as Philip Cohen, who wrote “I have come to see Rosin’s tendency toward exaggeration and misrepresentation as fundamental to its narrative and crippling to its credibility.” (Cohen, 2013, p. 1160). Cohen concludes that “Rosin’s conception of gender inequality is wrong: women are not in, nor are they rapidly approaching, a dominant position in the gender order. Instead, incremental progress in most areas has brought them closer to equality, but that destination remains far out of reach, and progress has slowed or stalled.” (ibid, p. 1177).

In the conclusion of the ‘End of Men’, the Dutch seem to be incorporated in the ‘Homogenous, social welfare-minder Nordic countries‘ (p. 268). First, Rosin described Swedish fathers, 80% of whom now take some form of parental leave. After that, she quotes research on Dutch boys, who ‘maybe […] will lead the way and transport us all into a new era of sweeter teenage romance‘ (p. 268). Combined, the argument seems to imply, the Swedish and Dutch examples showcase how the ‘Nordic countries’ are ahead in gender equality and gender role attitudes.

Well, let’s take a closer look at that argument. First of all, the Netherlands simply are not part of the Nordic countries. Secondly, equating the uptake of parental leave by Swedish men to ideas about teenage romance among Dutch boys, is a good illustration of the haphazard comparisons that are made throughout the book. Thirdly, the Netherlands and Sweden are not ‘homogeneous’ (nor are the Nordic countries of Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark). This was obscured by the haphazard presentation of ‘evidence': if we only look at systematic comparisons between (in this case) Sweden and the Netherlands, it becomes apparent that the uptake of parental leave by Dutch fathers is nowhere near the reported 80% of Swedish fathers.

To illustrate this latter argument, let’s have a look at men’s and women’s labour force participation in the Netherlands, before and after becoming a first-time parent. This table was obtained from the Dutch Statistical Office (source, in Dutch). Before parenthood, labour force participation seems quite gender egalitarian in the Netherlands (not taking into account part-time employment): 4% of to-be fathers were not employed, compared to 13% of to-be mothers. However, when the first child was born, 7% of the young fathers stopped employment of reduced his hours, compared to 37% of the young mothers. That is more than 5 times as much. In sum, this means that almost 9 out of 10 young fathers stayed in the labour force or even increased his working hours, compared to only half of the young mothers. So, the ‘end of men’ does not seem near (nigh?) in the Netherlands, which is further illustrated by the Dutch minister of social affairs who suggested to increase paternity leave from 2 days (!!) to 5 days: these plans were severely criticised in the public debate.

With respect to Sweden: fathers’ uptake is relatively high there (80%, according to Rosin), but that is to a large extent due to how parental leave is regulated in Sweden. Each parent receives 240 days of paid leave. Parents need to use these days before their child reaches the age of 8, but can transfer these days to each other. This means that one parent can use much more leave than the other parent. Only 60 days are non-transferable, meaning that if either parent does not personally use them they are lost. This parental leave arrangement boosts fathers’ take-up of leave, but guess which parent takes up most leave? A study using Swedish register data showed that 77% of total parental leave days were used by, indeed, the mothers.

So, irrespective of the misrepresentation (or my misreading) of the Netherlands as being a Nordic country, or homogeneous, neither the Dutch nor the Swedes provide convincing evidence of the end of men.

References

Philip Cohen (2013). The “End of Men” Is Not True: What Is Not and What Might Be on the Road Toward Gender Equality BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1159-1184

Rosin, H. (2013). The End of Men. And the Rise of Women (Paperback Edition). Penguin Books.